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ARGUMENT 
MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST REGARDING THE TERMS OF THE 
CONTRACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court's basis for granting summary judgment for 
Mr. Eardley is succinctly stated in its Conclusions of Law No. 4: 
The evidence amply demonstrates that the 
conduct alleged by plaintiff is equally 
referable to a series of six contracts each 
having a duration of one year as it is to a 
single contract for a term of more than one 
year. (emphasis added) 
The very language of the finding demonstrates the 
existence of a material question of fact, i.e., what was the term 
of the plaintiff's contract, renewable yearly (as claimed by Mr. 
Eardley) or open ended with no ending date (as claimed by Mr. 
Clayton)? If indeed, as the trial court states in said Conclusion 
of Law, Mr. Clayton's conduct shows a series of one year contracts 
as equally as it shows one contract for more than one year, the 
material fact question is self evident. And if the evidence 
appears to support either proposition equally, the issue should be 
left for trial. Thus the very existence of that question, with 
each side alleging by affidavit the opposite of the other, 
precludes summary judgment. 
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The question of fact is material since if the parties had 
only one contract with no ending date, then all of plaintiff's 
conduct necessarily related only to that single multi-year contract 
and the part performance exception of the Statue of Frauds clearly 
applies. If, however, it is a series of yearly contracts then his 
conduct relates to more than one contract and, according to Mr. 
Eardley's reasoning, defeats the part performance exception. 
A contract admittedly exists between the parties, only 
the terms thereof are in question. (R.24, 25) With each side 
claiming different terms of the oral contract the question 
naturally arises, who is right, Mr. Clayton or Mr. Eardley? The 
decision of whose version of the oral contract's terms is correct 
is logically material to solving the dispute. Hence, the fact 
question is material to the issues at hand. 
Indeed, Mr. Eardley's own arguments show that a material 
fact question exists. For example, on page 6 of his brief he 
states his postulate that, Clayton's buying of the tickets is not 
exclusively referable to an alleged contract then states, 
Just as likely, Eardley merely offered, on six 
different occasions, to sell season and 
playoff tickets to Clayton, which separate 
offers Clayton accepted from 1989 to 1994. In 
this scenario, there were actually six 
contracts, each lasting one season rather 
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than one continuous contract alleged by 
Clayton. (emphasis added) 
Such language as ujust as likely" and uin this scenario" and to 
accompanying argument is not that of a case where fact questions 
are settled, but are the language and argument of uncertainty as to 
which it is, one contract or more than one contract. 
Likewise in point III, on page 8 of Mr. Eardley's brief, 
in attempting to defeat plaintiff's claims that material fact 
questions exist, actually admits that they do: 
Any factual questions go only to whether there 
was one indefinite contract between Clayton 
and Eardley or whether or there were six new 
contracts. (emphasis added) 
This is the same unresolved fact questions that Clayton raises and 
shows that Clayton and Eardley both believe a fact question 
remains. 
Summary judgment was inappropriate because, viewing the 
facts in a light most favorable to him as required by law, (i.e. 
that there was only one contract and Mr. Clayton performed under it 
for six years) shows a valid claim of part performance sufficient 
to remove the contract from the Statue of Frauds. The question of 
whether the contract was one for years or a series of one year 
contracts is a the material question of fact which should defeat 
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Mr. Eardley's summary judgment motion. Summary judgment is proper 
only when there are no genuine issues of material fact. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 56 (c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 p.2d 
231 (Utah 1993) . The trial court erred in applying the law of part 
performance and incorrectly held there were no disputed issues of 
material fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Eardley basis his argument on the premise that the 
Court found it equally likely that there were six one year 
contracts as there was one multi-year contract, therefore, Mr. 
Clayton cannot claim part performance. He reasons that therefore, 
Mr. Clayton's performance is not "exclusively referable" to a 
contract. However, the entire argument of Mr. Eardley only goes to 
demonstrate that there was indeed a material question of fact 
precluding summary judgment: whether or not there were six 
separate contracts or one multi-year contract. If there was only 
one multi-year contract Mr. Clayton's performance could only be 
attributed to that contract. If there was more that one contract, 
then his conduct would be attributed to several contracts. 
However, either way that question is answered, it raises a material 
question of fact that precluded summary judgment. The facts looked 
at in a light most favorable to Mr. Clayton show that summary 
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judgment was improper and that the decision of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
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